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Neurophenomenological (NP) methods integrate objective and subjective data in ways
that retain the statistical power of established disciplines (like cognitive science) while
embracing the value of ﬁrst-person reports of experience. The present paper positions
neurophenomenology as an approach that pulls from traditions of cognitive science but
includes techniques that are challenging for cognitive science in some ways. A baseline
study is reviewed for “lessons learned,” that is, the potential methodological improvements
that will support advancements in understanding consciousness and cognition using
neurophenomenology. These improvements, we suggest, include (1) addressing issues
of interdisciplinarity by purposefully and systematically creating and maintaining shared
mental models among research team members; (2) making sure that NP experiments
include high standards of experimental design and execution to achieve variable control,
reliability, generalizability, and replication of results; and (3) conceiving of phenomenological
interview techniques as placing the impetus on the interviewer in interaction with the
experimental subject.
Keywords: neurophenomenology, EEG, experience, simulation, experimental methods, phenomenological inter-
view
INTRODUCTION
The tension of scientiﬁc exploration involves both push and pull;
it launches outward, across seas or solar systems, and yet draws us
inward, into the depths of Earth and of our own minds. The topics
presented in this article balance on that tension, with reference to
a study of the inner experience of the mind as it faces outward
toward the expanse of space. More speciﬁcally, the aim is to criti-
cally evaluate neurophenomenological (NP) methods for studying
ﬁrst-person experiences. We describe the techniques used in a
baseline study and highlight areas for methodological improve-
ment that may be helpful in future NP research. The baseline
study acts as a reference point from which recommendations for
methodological improvements may be extrapolated, contributing
to the reﬁnement of neurophenomenology as an approach for
studying human experience.
After reviewing someof the context of the broaderNP tradition,
emphasizing its relationship to (and contrast from) other cognitive
science methods (see Neurophenomenological Methodology), we
present an overview of the baseline study (see Overview of the
Baseline Experiment). The ﬁnal section includes an outline of the
key“lessons learned”about NP methodology in the baseline study.
NEUROPHENOMENOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY
While the nature of human experience has been questioned since
the time of Aristotle, there is still no consensus in the scientiﬁc
community regarding methods to approach such inquiries. Neu-
rophenomenology is one promising approach, as its core purpose
is to connect research in the various ﬁelds that study experience
in a manner that fully integrates ﬁrst-person experiential accounts
with third-person neuroscientiﬁc measurements. To achieve this
goal neurophenomenologyuses techniques fromcognitive science,
neuroscience, and philosophical phenomenology in an attempt to
piece together a dynamic and inclusive picture.
As its name implies, neurophenomenology blends data col-
lection methods from neuroscience and phenomenology. Phe-
nomenology is a diversiﬁed philosophical approach initiated in
the twentieth century by Edmund Husserl. It was conceived as a
descriptive and analytic study of consciousness, including aspects
of intentionality (the directedness or “aboutness” feature of con-
sciousness) and phenomenality (the qualitative feel of what it is
like to experience something). Philosophers in this philosophi-
cal tradition, like Heidegger (1962) and Merleau-Ponty (2012),
emphasizedpragmatic, existential, and embodied aspects of being-
in-the-world and situated cognition. The neurobiologist, Varela
(1996), built on the work of these philosophers in order to deﬁne
the NP method.
One of the objectives of experimental neurophenomenol-
ogy is to bridge ﬁrst-person experience and neurophysiological
data (Varela, 1996). As a form of naturalized phenomenology
(Petitot, 1999) it introduces the phenomenological method into
the experimental lab. In experiments by Lutz et al. (2002), for
example, Varela and his colleagues used phenomenologically
trained subjects to report on their experiences of readiness or
unreadiness for a perceptual task. A set of experiential categories
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(“phenomenological clusters”) were generated from the reports of
the participants in an initial training and testing session. Exper-
imenters were then able to use these categories in subsequent
testing to ﬁnd strict correlations between dynamical brain pro-
cesses (measured with electroencephalography, EEG), reaction
times and the speciﬁc categories of experience.
Lutz et al. (2002), using NP methods, were able to capture
and categorize variable attentional factors that are difﬁcult to
manipulate, though they enter into many empirical studies of per-
ception, but are usually discounted in standard neuroscientiﬁc
and behavioral studies using statistical averaging techniques – i.e.,
such factors are usually treated as “noise.” NP methods allowed
the experimenters to show that speciﬁc variations in the patterns
of endogenous synchrony in frontal electrodes just prior to pre-
sentation of a perceptual stimulus correlated precisely (and with
stability over several recordings)with degrees of attention reported
by the participants, and with behavioral performance (reaction
times). The correlation with behavioral data may suggest that the
same attentional variations could be deﬁned in strictly behavioral
terms. Use of behavioral measures alone, however, does not rule
out the possibility that reaction time variations were due to other,
non-attentional factors. Use of qualitative ﬁrst-person reports fur-
ther provides a richer and more precise characterization of the
texture and structure of conscious experience. As Lutz et al. (2002)
suggest, the NP strategy can be understood as an extension of
traditional procedures in cognitive science based on the use of
verbal reports and post-experiment questionnaires. The emphasis
on ﬁrst-person experience, and the use of detailed phenomeno-
logical methods by trained subjects, however, deﬁnes a difference
from more standard experimental practices.
The phenomenologicalmethods employed inNP studies derive
from and simplify the methodology explicated by Husserl (1970).
Varela (1996) provided the most succinct summary of the steps
employed in NP research:
(1) Subjects (as well as experimenters) suspend their beliefs or
theories about experience;
(2) Subjects gain intimacy with the domain of investigation
by reﬂectively focusing on how they are experiencing the
stimulus;
(3) Subjects offer descriptions that are then intersubjectively
validated.
One important aspect of NP method is the avoidance of
pre-deﬁned categories. This correlates with the emphasis on ﬁrst-
person report and the suspensionof theories. It reﬂects the attempt
to stay with the subject’s experience without imposing external
criteria or concepts, or assuming that we already know what such
experience is like. In Lutz et al. (2002), for example, categories
used to analyze the results were drawn exclusively from phe-
nomenological reports developed in a preliminary set of trials. The
procedure can be guided by the experimenter through open ques-
tions, that is, questions directed at the subject’s experience rather
than their opinions or theories (see Pierre, 1994; Petitmengin-
Peugeot, 1999). Such questions do not impose pre-determined
theoretical categories. Rather than asking“Do you think this expe-
rience is like X or Y, or Z?” the experimenter asks simply, “How
would you describe your experience?” By posing open questions
immediately after the task Lutz et al. (2002) motivated focus on
the implicit strategy used by the subject, or the degree of atten-
tion implemented during the task. The descriptive categories were
then intersubjectively validated across subjects in determining
the descriptive categories that were used in subsequent testing.
The phenomenological categories then merit scientiﬁc validation
through correlation with objective measurements of behavior and
brain activity. Varela (1996) andVarela and Shear (1999) proposed
a system of dynamic reciprocal constraints (DRCs) to illustrate this
interplay of multi-source data. In the DRC model, constraints on
data come, not from an externalized assumption of objectivity, but
from a co-regulated interaction of subjective experiential reports
and analyses of neurophysiological data. DRC distinguishes neu-
rophenomenology fromother approaches to handling ﬁrst-person
data by establishing a model that captures the interaction of
scientist and experimental subjects.
On the one hand, in contrast to DRC, in many cognitive sci-
entiﬁc studies ﬁrst-person data will be collected in the form of
pre-deﬁned scales and surveys. Less typically, participants may be
interviewed, but every participant would be exposed to identical
questions. Of course, these are legitimate scientiﬁc practices, as
cognitive science attempts to attribute any variation in behavior
to either experimental manipulations or individual differences.
Researchers seek to control the parameters to draw strong conclu-
sions about the inﬂuence of external factors on individuals. Such
studies analyze data over identical conditions applied to diverse
participants, but in so doing, they risk overlooking important
aspects of experience such as attentive states, emergent distractive
thoughts, or individual cognitive strategies.
On the other hand, the particular NP paradigm proposed by
Varela and used in the Lutz et al. (2002) study is clearly limited
both in terms of the types of experiments that can be conducted
and by the requirement that subjects be trained in phenomeno-
logical method. In addition its focus is on the precise relation
betweenbraindynamics andﬁrst-person experience. Alternatively,
it is also possible to introduce previously established phenomeno-
logical insights or distinctions into the design of an experiment
(so-called “front-loading” phenomenology; Gallagher and Varela,
2003). This, approach, which remains consistent with neurophe-
nomenology and the DRC model, avoids the necessity of training
subjects. It also widens the scope of experiments that can be
informed by phenomenology andwidens the scope of the dynamic
factors that can be studied to include extra-neural and extra-
experiential factors, such as bodily, environmental, social, and
cultural constraints.
In this same spirit of widening the scope of neurophenomenol-
ogy, Petitmengin (2006) argued that there are ways to help an
untrained participant accurately articulate subjective experience.
The solution is a detailed interviewmethod. Petitmengin acknowl-
edges that it is wrong to assume that simply being aware of an
experience would, necessarily, improve the articulation of the
experience. She suggests that phenomenological interview tech-
niques can help untrained participants attend to and articulate
their experience. To test this idea, she conducted phenomeno-
logical interviews with nine epileptic patients over the course of
eighteen months. All of the participants experienced pharma-
resistant temporal lobe focal seizure epilepsy. The interviews were
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used to generate phenomenological clusters of preictal state expe-
riences,whichwere subsequently used to interpret EEG readings in
a novel manner. The results suggested that preictal experiences are
manifest in epileptic patients much earlier than neuroscientists
had expected (Petitmengin, 2006). While a questionnaire might
have provided quantitative data that could generalize something
about preictal experiences, the purpose for the phenomenolog-
ical interview was to go much deeper. The interviews sought a
smaller number of experiences in higher levels of unique detail.
Using phenomenological interviews in these contexts, Petitmen-
gin collected data that fed into the DRC paradigm and yielded
results that contributed to both the theoretical science of epilepsy
and the therapeutic know-how of patients involved in the research
program. The subjects in the study were able to become aware
of subtle experiential symptoms that predicted the arrival of a
seizure, and were able to take countermeasures to interrupt these
processes and avoid the seizure (Petitmengin, 2006).
First-person data inevitably pose large philosophical problems
for empirical science, and these problems are manifest in two
philosophical challenges to NP. One challenge involves reduction-
ism, which is the proposition that explanations of consciousness
and cognition can be reduced to purely physiological explanations,
thereby eliminating the need to talk about ﬁrst-person experience.
The other challenge concerns sufﬁciency; it questions the capa-
bility of neurophenomenology to deliver on its promises to reveal
anything that traditional scientiﬁc methods cannot capture.
One might respond to the reductionist challenge by arguing
that science must strive “to explain what there is” (Gallagher,
2007, p. 311). Consequently, the category of what there is must
not omit those things that are not quantiﬁable or exclude those
phenomena that involve extra-neural factors (e.g., social interac-
tion processes, which are not reducible to individual mechanisms;
De Jaegher et al., 2010). Researchers ought not to accept the
elimination of ﬁrst-personal processes and unique experiences
because of the rigidities of scientiﬁc methods; rather science can
expand its methods to include the phenomenological practices
that capture, investigate, and explain what may be irreducible to
strictly neural processes. Precisely by refusing to objectify subjec-
tive experience, phenomenology can allow science to encompass
a broader ﬁeld for methodological examination. To simply accept
the reductionist doctrine is to prematurely reject the potential of
phenomenological experimentation.
The second challenge hinges on a narrow view of the problem
to be solved. Bayne (2004) criticized neurophenomenology for
failing to close the “explanatory gap” (between consciousness and
purely physiological events) and offering no distinct approach for
doing so. This view accepts a certain dualist and internalist way
of deﬁning the problem of consciousness, often referred to as
the“hard problem”(Chalmers, 1995). On this view, consciousness
(and the rich and diverse experiences of humans found in all kinds
of situations) should be explained strictly in terms of brain pro-
cesses, yet there seems to be no way to construct a causal bridge
between purely physiological processes and ﬁrst-person experi-
ence. This way of deﬁning the problem can itself be challenged
by suggesting that non-neural factors, such as extra-neural bod-
ily processes, environmental affordances, social interactions, and
cultural factors need to be part of the explanatory mix, and that
there are perfectly legitimate scientiﬁc disciplines that study such
phenomena. Even if one accepts the idea of an explanatory gap,
however, as Thompson et al. (2005) point out, it involves different
dimensions: conceptual, epistemological, and methodological.
• The conceptual gap involves the need for a conceptual frame-
work to integrate ﬁrst-person experience, the ability to report,
and the manifestation of neurobiological responses.
• The epistemological gap includes issues of meta-awareness, or
the potentially deforming effects of reﬂectively attending to
experience and re-experiencing something in memory.
• The methodological gap involves the means by which ﬁrst-
person data is generated, handled, and analyzed.
Whether, as neurophenomenology matures, it can address all
of these issues remains to be seen. The present work focuses on the
methodological issue, but it would be erroneous to assume that
any of these challenges function in isolation.
Notwithstanding these broader issues, there is reason to believe
thatNPmethods can accomplish something important. For exam-
ple, studies using phenomenological techniques in the evaluation
and therapies of epilepsy and other neurophysical conditions indi-
cate validity for the broader category of NP approaches (see, e.g.,
Le Van Quyen and Petitmengin, 2002). Accordingly, by focusing
on some methodological issues in the following sections we pro-
pose to improve NP procedures, which can, in turn, contribute
to providing a better understanding of human experience. Neu-
rophenomenology can give us better ways of handling ﬁrst-person
data in a reliable and productive way, providing clariﬁcations and
classiﬁcations that are not captured by typical cognitive science
approaches. However, in order for the full potential of neurophe-
nomenology to be achieved, reﬁning the procedure for application
is necessary. We have seen developments in neurophenomenology
in the past two decades, but detailed lessons learned from a case
are suggested below to aid those preparing or considering using
NP methodology. The following sections are proposed to serve
as a practitioners guide for implementing NP methods. These
recommendations are novel and explicit instructions for multidis-
ciplinary instantiation of NP methods, but are presented with the
goal of inviting continued advancement of NP methodology.
OVERVIEW OF THE BASELINE EXPERIMENT
The preceding sections have outlined the philosophical and the-
oretical position of neurophenomenology, positioning it as both
complementary to some, but divergent from other practices of
cognitive science. In this section we introduce a baseline exper-
iment conducted using NP methods. We reﬂect on a number
of methodological problems that became apparent in the post-
experimental evaluations, problems that have concrete method-
ological solutions. The baseline experiment thus provides a good
opportunity to reﬂect on some potential issues that may arise as
experimenters attempt to employ NP methods. Some of these
issues may be speciﬁc to this particular kind of study; others may
apply generally to NP investigations.
This baseline experiment focuses on experiences undergone
by astronauts during space ﬂights, recorded in their in-space
journals and in subsequent interviews. These experiences are
described variably as deeply esthetic, spiritual, or religious, and
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they involve affective states of awe, wonder, curiosity, and humil-
ity (AWCH). The baseline study attempted to replicate and
understand these experiences by placing subjects in simulated
space-travel environments, recording neurological data (using
EEG and functional near-infrared spectroscopy, fNIR) and physi-
ological data (using ECG), and correlated ﬁrst-person experiences
(using phenomenological interviews and psychological surveys).
SPIRITUAL AND ESTHETIC EXPERIENCES
For the purpose of the baseline study, the researchers examined
the constructs of AWCH.AWCH recur in the experiential accounts
collected from astronauts’ (including cosmonauts’) journals and
interviews. The astronauts’ narratives carry a unique power for
many reasons. First, their demographics consist largely of scien-
tists. Some signiﬁcant number of them return from the experience
of spaceﬂight changed, and some of their reports indicate that
these changes are spiritual in nature. They report being moved
affectively in amanner they describe as eliciting an internal change.
They return to earth with a sense of something bigger “out there.”
Second, they experience something that few other humans experi-
ence, extraterrestrial space. This is not to deny, of course, that there
are numerous experiences that could elicit AWCH here on earth
(e.g., witnessing birth, seeing natural spectacles like the Grand
Canyon or Victoria Falls, or walking through icons of human
ingenuity such as the Great Wall or the Coliseum).
In the past decade, scientists have promoted the cultivation of
awe as a beneﬁcial characteristic for clinical psychology and other
areas of patient care. This perspective comes out of a larger move-
ment that embraces an interdisciplinary approach to studying
religious and spiritual experiencemore broadly. The larger project,
as Taves (2010)would frame it, attempts to apply scientiﬁcmethod
to aspects of religious texts and explain human animals’ senses
of spirituality. This approach, however, is distinct from previous
ones that aimed at naturalizing human spirituality (Dewey, 1991;
Maslow, 1994). A standard naturalized approach would consider
every aspect of a phenomenon under an objective lens. In con-
trast, an interdisciplinary approach that incorporates NP methods
works to incorporate the potential value of subjective data in the
discussions of spiritual and esthetic phenomena. This is still a nat-
uralized approach, but not one that attempts to reduce experience
to objective data. One ambitious goal for such an approach would
be to investigate the relationships between affect, reason, and spir-
itual experiences in an empirical manner (as opposed to leaving
such inquiries just to philosophical or (heaven forbid!) theolog-
ical speculation). Ultimately, interdisciplinary research, such as
that conducted through neurophenomenology, helps mend dis-
parate fragments of the dynamic complexity that links the human
mind and human behaviors in experiences of all sorts.
To explore the interdisciplinary challenges inherent to NP
examinations of spiritual and esthetic experiences in any useful
way, it is essential to narrow the focus and establish a shared
nomenclature. In the research examined herein, awe and wonder
provide construct exemplars. Awe, as a component of spiritual and
religious experience, has been discussed in historic philosophical
traditions. In the eighteenth century, Edmund Burke’s philosophi-
cal treatises struggle with the sublime and beautiful, binding these
constructs conceptually with awe-ﬁlled emotions. These emotions
do not imply pleasure, in its most obvious sense, but Burke (2010)
asserts that people experience awe inseparably from terror, power,
obscurity, and humility.
For purposes of our study, Gallagher et al. (in press) deﬁne
awe as a direct and initial feeling when faced with something
incomprehensible or sublime. In contrast to the directness of awe,
wonder demands cognitive reﬂection. Fuller (2009) argued that
wonder bridges emotion with the desire to apply order to the
universe. This repeats the sentiment of Magnus (1988, p. 557),
who a millennium ago stated, “. . . wonder is the movement of
the man who does not know on his way to ﬁnding out.” The
present research deﬁnes wonder as a more reﬂective feeling one
has when unable to put things into a familiar conceptual frame-
work. Curiosity, also involves a desire to piece things together,
but in a different way. Curiosity involves wanting to know, see,
experience, and/or understand more (Gallagher et al., in press).
The object of this wanting may be technical, logical, moral, or
existential. In 1914, John Milton McIndoo asserted that curios-
ity opposes the impulse to ﬂee in fear. That which may incite
fear at ﬁrst, may become intriguing, as familiarity grows. In this
respect, curiosity, which is “world-oriented,” acts as an important
contrast to humility, which is “self-oriented.” Philosophers and
theorists vary greatly concerning the nature of humility, attach-
ing it to everything from psychological concerns of self-esteem,
roles within cultures, and the limits of knowledge within the uni-
verse (Tangney, 2000). Regardless, humility demands a sense of
perspective, where one must place oneself in scale to someone or
something else. In the present study, humility is a sense one has
about one’s relation to the universe (an issue of scale) or one’s sig-
niﬁcance (an issue of moral aspect). Starting with these working
deﬁnitions of AWCH, researchers applying an interdisciplinaryNP
approach can examine experiential phenomena and offer possible
interpretations of the ﬁndings.
THE ART AND SCIENCE OF SIMULATION
The baseline experiment was part of a collaborative interdisci-
plinary project entitledSpace, Science, and Spirituality. Researchers
from multiple disciplines coordinated their efforts to create an
immersive simulation of space travel for the purpose of gathering
neurophysiological and phenomenological data. Astronauts had
captured the novelty of space travel in written journals contain-
ing detailed descriptions of both visual and affective experiences.
Hermeneutic and semantic analyses were used to identify and
categorize the ways astronauts verbally expressed their experi-
ences in these texts. Details from these accounts then informed
the design of a mixed-reality immersive test environment where
participants viewed simulations of space views, and provided a
narrative comparison for ﬁrst-person experiential accounts. Sim-
ulation artists and engineers usedNASA images selected on criteria
developed by researchers at the Kolleg-Forschergruppe Bildakt und
Verkörperung (Humboldt University, Berlin). The Bildakt analyses
revealed necessary requirements for the images used in the simu-
lation including characteristics of photograph quality and image
angle and perspective. With these conditions in mind, the team
designed a set for a mixed-reality simulation wherein participants
were immersed in the sounds and visuals resembling something
like a science ﬁction movie set.
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Both the baseline study and other experiments in this project
used simulation technologies to generate controlled conditions.
Varying degrees of realistic experiences are possible within vir-
tual reality simulators and they can allow for NP research to be
conducted with high levels of control (Sherman and Craig, 2002).
To establish an effective simulation experience, designers must
address immersion, point-of-view, and practical venue concerns.
Thus, considerations of quality and presence should be integrated
into the simulation design. That is, the simulation should support
a willing suspension of disbelief and in doing so allow for a nar-
rative transfer that takes the participant into the world presented
within the simulation. The image requirements from the Bildakt
analyses (listed above) reﬂect an intention to increase immersion,
clarify point-of-view, and be applicable to the limitations of the
mixed-reality simulation environment used in the experiment.
Aspects of contextwere incorporated into the simulationdesign
and were crucial in the experimental strategy. All participants
experienced identical “launch” context narratives and were placed
in the same physical environment. Although the contextual cues
for all participants were objectively identical, the experienced
context varied due to a variety of factors, including the partici-
pant’s background and their current bodily state. In all research,
contextual circumstances, both objective and subjective, con-
tribute to the experience. Context consists of any information
or factor that can be used to characterize the circumstances or
situation of the participant. Multiple factors might be relevant
to the interaction between a participant and the simulation and
may or may not be manifest within the simulation itself; in this
regard, the participant determines the perception and experience
of relevancy. In basic NP research, this means that control of con-
textual variableswithin the experimental environment is of utmost
importance.
The baseline study applied these principles of simulation con-
text design in the development of the mixed-reality simulator and
the conditions presented therein. The experimenters presented
the study to participants in terms of simulated space travel and
worked to support the narrative that reinforced the idea that the
participant had been selected to have the unique opportunity
for virtual space travel. The experimenters worked to maintain
the story narrative of an impending launch, even while placing
neurophysiological sensors on the participant.
Researchers collected real-time physiological and neurophys-
iological measurements using EEG, ECG, and fNIR while the
participants were immersed in the mixed-reality environment and
observed the space scenes. The experimenter sat unseen by the par-
ticipant, outside of the space vehicle and could only be contacted
through radio control.
After “suiting up” with the various physiological and neuro-
physiological monitors, the participant was in the mixed-reality
environment which resembled the interior of a space vehicle
(based on images of the interior of the International Space Sta-
tion). The participant then, after a short delay, experienced a
launch sequence (countdown and a convincing audio experience,
as the chair and space vehicle were stationary), followed by silence.
Once the participant was “in space” large computer monitors
embedded in the walls of the space vehicle opened virtual por-
tals revealing dynamic images of space, including views of Earth,
Moon, the International Space Station, and expanses of stars. After
the participant viewed the images, the space vehicle “returned to
earth” (relayed to the participant through radio control) and the
participant answered brief questionnaires, repeating some of the
questions that had been asked previously and introducing ques-
tions of workload. Experimenters removed all sensors and then
brought the participant to meet an interviewer. The interviewers
were philosophy graduate students trained in phenomenologi-
cal interview techniques. Interviewers escorted participants to
another area for interviewing, with the succinct goal of exploring
the participant’s experience during the simulated space ﬂight.
From the beginning to the end, the baseline experiment was
executed much like a relay race, with researchers passing the
baton from one stage of the experiment to the next. The anal-
ysis of the collected data required a division of labor by the
various contributing disciplines. Human factors psychology and
neuroscience experts examined the data from the psycholog-
ical and neurophysiological measurements. Phenomenologists
reviewed the transcripts and recordings of the interviews and
conducted linguistic and hermeneutical analyses. The latter was
informed by a previous analysis of the astronaut journals that pro-
vided 37 categories reﬂecting AWCH experiences. That starting
point was leveraged for a comparative evaluation of the partic-
ipant interviews. The results showed promise. For example, in
preliminary analyses, the results of the neurophysiological data
indicated engagement of frontal lobes during the feeling of won-
der and parietal lobes during physical affect. Participants who
reported experiencing awe, wonder, religiousness, or spirituality
were compared to those who did not indicate such experiences.
Neural activity varied signiﬁcantly between experiencers and non-
experiencers and was greater for the Earth view than the Deep
Space view. In addition, participants who reported higher levels of
religiousness (as indicated in the questionnaires) were more likely
to report awe and wonder when viewing the Earth (as opposed to
only stars).
LESSONS LEARNED
The results did not lack merit. To the contrary, the results pro-
vided information about human phenomena that otherwise have
garnered little empirical exploration to date. The results of the
baseline experiment contribute to a compelling case in favor of
further exploration using neurophenomenology. The work sup-
ports the application of open-ended interviews for a broader
range of basic-research contexts. However, the experiment pro-
vides “lessons learned” for improving NP methods in hopes of
generating more conclusive results.
LESSON #1
Neurophenomenological experimentation must purposefully and
systematically include the creation andmaintenance of sharedmental
model (SMM).
Neurophenomenological research must embrace systematic
and thorough creation of SMMs as part of the neurophe-
nomenology as applied philosophy in the research world. Its
intrinsically interdisciplinary nature demands that contributing
domain experts avoid the “passing the baton” approach that can
result in a mere collection of data in a non-contextualized way
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(Van Rijnsoever and Hessels, 2011). Each part of the project (in
this case, analysis of texts, analysis of images, construction of the
simulation, neurological data collection, questionnaire adminis-
tration, phenomenological interview) has to be understood by all
members of the team in terms of the whole (Bockelman Morrow
and Fiore, 2013). As described in the previous section, our team for
the baseline experiment consisted of human factors psychologists,
philosophers, art historians, astronauts, simulation developers,
and computer engineers. Each contributing member adds value,
but entered the collaboration with differing vocabulary or seman-
tics for concepts and constructs. Working culture for each was
substantially different, yet understandable for the given domain.
According to expertise, each allocates priorities of tasks differently.
The NP approach can only be accomplished with all contributing
members operating from a shared lexicon and conceptual frame-
work. To achieve that, speciﬁc techniques for accomplishing the
SMM vary and should be considered according to the group and
its circumstances (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). In preparation
of another round of studies based on the preliminary ﬁndings
of the baseline experiment, the following techniques have been
employed: concept mapping prior to experimentation, ongoing
training of researchers regarding NP theories and methods, and
preparing analysis to handle the complexities inherent to the NP
data. These are examples of techniques for addressing the needed
SMM. Logistically, these take time. Scheduling regular meetings
for brainstorming and teaching, as well as creating a glossary and
living conceptual framework document are simple practices and
tools for successful NP implementation. The outcome should not
only be a productive experimental development collaboration, but
also lead to synthesized results, not individualistic pieces in inter-
pretation from each domain’s perspective. Instead the results are
the whole or a big chunk of puzzle.
LESSON #2
Neurophenomenological experimentation should be held to the high
standards of experimental design and execution to achieve variable
control, reliability, generalizability, and replication of results.
In the complexities of carrying out an interdisciplinary study
withmultiple parts, problems can arise. In the baseline study, there
were many possible variables that could have explained compo-
nents of the experience (e.g., launch narrative, the mixed-reality
components of the simulator, and changes in setting between expe-
rience and interview). It was therefore impossible to conclusively
determine which manipulations generated the various aspects of
the experiences. In part, this problem in the baseline study was
the result of inadequate SMMs mentioned above. Team members,
working within the conﬁnes of their own specialized disciplines
were not always able to see the whole picture, and this had an
effect on the overall design of the experiment. This, of course, is
not inevitable, or necessarily a characteristic of other NP experi-
ments, but that this problem did characterize the baseline study
suggests that adopting different practices is something that needs
to bemade explicit. Accordingly, the secondmethodological lesson
is a reminder that psychology and the cognitive sciences already
have a time-tested tradition of precision in experimentation and
that neurophenomenology can beneﬁt from attending to many of
the practices involved in this tradition.
As researchers design a NP experiment, they should consider
many of the questions that their counterparts in traditional cog-
nitive science might ask. For example, does it make sense to
generalize ﬁrst-person data? Cognitive scientists, with a ﬁrm foot-
ing in psychology, consider the extent to which any ﬁnding can
be generalized to the population at large, and that consideration
may affect the manner in which the data is both collected and han-
dled. Neurophenomenologists need to grapple with that question
as well, and avoid oversimpliﬁcation of the factors that contribute
to the results.
In addition to generalizability, cognitive psychology also con-
siders veriﬁcation. A well-formed NP study needs to consider
procedures for the veriﬁcation of subjective experience. The
baseline study, due to the length of experimental sessions and
the uniqueness of using the NP approach, only included one
aspect from each ﬁeld that compose neurophenomenology. In
otherwords, neurological and physiologicalmeasures fromneuro-
science were used to assess one part of the participants’ experience
(physical response), questionnaires from psychology were used to
assess another part of the participants’ experience (demographic
information, traits, and cognitive response to the immersive envi-
ronment), and phenomenological interviews from philosophy
assess participants’ linguistic attribution of their experience in the
environment as though they were reliving the experience. There
was no overlap; no checks and balances. Strictly, this was a neu-
rophenomenology study, but not an optimal application of NP
methods, which thereby limit the power of the interpretation of
the results. Again, to iterate, the data attained from the baseline
experiment is useful and informative to the phenomenon under
investigation as seen from each discipline, but perhaps short of the
ideal of neurophenomenology.
Depending on the study, other disciplines can provide com-
plementary tools for veriﬁcation. On its own, a Likert scale
of self-reported affect (a tool from psychology) will not cap-
ture lived experience. However, it can provide correlations and
comparisons that can provide veriﬁcation when interpreting the
ﬁndings from the phenomenological interviews. When designing
the experiment, researchers can incorporate established methods
frompsychology, taking care to avoid inﬂuencing the phenomeno-
logical interview. For example, a sliding qualitative scale of affect
can be given after the phenomenological interview. The informa-
tion from the scale can provide support to the textual analyses
of the interviews. The scale cannot, on its own, capture unique
lived experience, but it can add credence to the basic ﬁndings in
neurophenomenology.
In regard to using methods from cognitive science, researchers
designing NP experiments must also consider the replicability of
their experiments. For example, neurophenomenology has been
used to explore experience in epileptic preictal states (Le Van
Quyen and Petitmengin, 2002, Petitmengin, 2010). In this exam-
ple of applied neurophenomenology, the lack of control (variation
between subjects) provides an explanation for any inability to
reproduce results. After all, the patients were not being stud-
ied to capture generalizable aspects of preictal experience, but to
improve the identiﬁcation of preictal states in epileptic patients.
The study not only made a signiﬁcant contribution to epilepsy
research, but it has also played an immeasurably valuable role in
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the lives of patients who beneﬁted directly from participating in
the study. However, basic research should typically include high
levels of control and produce highly predictable and reproducible
results and this can also be accomplished in NP methods. The
baseline study does hold to the methodological rigor for reliabil-
ity. However, this lesson learned is from the literature foundation
from which we derived our phenomenological interview practices.
One of the key objectives of neurophenomenology is to func-
tion within experimentation. Therefore, attention must be paid
to experimental rigor, precedence, and scientiﬁc acceptance. This
understanding beneﬁts the ability of a multidisciplinary team to
succeed in employing the NP approach.
To do this, the experimental design might include the embrac-
ing of simulation technology. Simulation test beds allow for high
variable control and precise stimulus/response recordings, con-
sequently increasing successful replication. Simulations can be
shared between institutions, permitting more diverse popula-
tion testing (and bringing the results higher generalizability as
well). For example, future experiments in our project will use a
portable simulation environment. This form of immersive sim-
ulation allows the presentation to be packed up and taken to
another location, so that other locales can beneﬁt from the tech-
nique. It also is a straightforward, and relatively cost-effective
form of simulation presentation, so that laboratories with limited
simulator resources can erect similar systems. A digitally con-
trolled presentation of experimental stimuli allows for improved
generalizability, replicability, and veriﬁcation, and can thereby
give more credence and credibility to the NP ﬁndings. Interplay
between the phenomenological project and some techniques of
cognitive science can generate a unique integrative methodol-
ogy. As such, neurophenomenology should take the best of the
practices of cognitive science, while contributing its unique tech-
niques that have not been a common part of the cognitive science
toolbox.
LESSON #3
The phenomenological interview places the impetus for training on
the interviewer, not the participant, so that the interviewer may act
to support the participant in precise experiential reporting.
The third lesson to extract from thebaseline study is that the real
question of phenomenological training should shift from focusing
on the participant to the interviewer.
Though Lesson #2 argued for the importance of adopting spe-
ciﬁc practices from cognitive science, Lesson #3 involves the aspect
of neurophenomenology that stands in contrast to cognitive sci-
ence. To work through the argument, it is essential to ﬁrst describe
the role of training in the interview. The “training trade-off”
depicts how the line between the interviewer and interviewee can
dissolve, so that the interviewer actually participates in the reﬂec-
tion and articulation of experience. This participation on the part
of the interviewer is a marked difference from the objective tech-
niques of cognitive science and as such, has potential for opening
forms of data collection and analyses of experience that have not
yet been fully explored.
As discussed above, much NP research has been based on
the idea that only a person trained in introspective or phe-
nomenological techniques can provide details with the degree of
precision required for meaningful results (cf. Varela and Shear,
1999; Lutz et al., 2007). Petitmengin’s (2006) technique strays from
that position and accommodates information from the untrained
participant. In the baseline experiment and further continuing
experiments, we have adhered to the interview techniques found
in Petitmengin (2006). One of the observations made from the
baseline experiment is that this is not a training binary (i.e., par-
ticipants either are capable of good phenomenological reﬂection
or completely lack self-awareness), but a continuum. This obser-
vation was attained in reviewing the interview transcripts. The
questions asked directly inﬂuenced the articulations from the
participants and the follow-up paraphrasing or reﬂecting like-
wise affected the topics discussed by the participants. The level
of phenomenological (or introspection or mindfulness) training
on the part of the participant leads to a “training trade-off” in
respect to the interviewer. The less experienced the participant
(to the limit of never having practiced phenomenological reﬂec-
tion), the more training the interviewer needs in ways to help
draw out the experience while carefully avoiding any priming of
the participant. The opposite is true as well; a participant well-
trained in introspection, reﬂection, or mindfulness might not
require a highly skilled interviewer to draw out the experiential
data.
The impact on methodology is that the emphasis shifts from a
question about the degree of training a participant does or does
not receive. This degree of self-awareness cannot be controlled in
participants with the interview approach. Instead, the onus for
training is directed toward the interviewer. The training trade-
off is compensatory, in that the interviewer’s skill will improve the
chances of theuntrainedparticipant’s successful articulationof her
experience. If the interviewer is workingwith Buddhistmonks, she
may not need to receive a great deal of training and may be able
to simply tell the participant the focus of the study. Conversely,
if the same interviewer is working with undergrads at any given
university in the West, she may need to pull from a collection of
tools and techniques to give the participant the capacity to access
the thoughts and feelings experienced.
It should be noted that, while the training trade-off is pre-
sented, primarily as a methodological lesson, it has important
theoretical weight as well. This dynamic between interviewer and
participant has value for the debate regarding phenomenologi-
cal experimentation. The dynamic interaction demanded by the
NP interview method is not part of traditional cognitive science.
In the NP interview, there is a cognitive off-loading by the par-
ticipant onto the interviewer that traditional psychology does
not always recognize. The phenomenological interviewer has the
power, if executed in the manner described herein, to do some
of the cognitive work of focusing the participant precisely on the
participant’s lived experience, a task that may be otherwise impos-
sible for the untrained participant. This is not one of the tools of
traditional cognitive psychology. When psychologists employ the
similar technique of introspection (perhaps in therapeutic sessions
like hypnosis), they involve actually training the participant to look
inward. The goal, in such cases, is not to extrapolate a description
of an experience itself. Rather, interview questions are tools used,
perhaps by applied psychologists/therapists, but certainly not typ-
ically by basic researchers. When neurophenomenology employs
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the interview, it is a core method that is fundamentally part of
the experimental approach, and as such it changes the way the
ﬁrst-person experiential data is captured and handled.
This does not degrade the ﬁrst-person experience, treating it
as third-person data (as Dennett, 1991 suggests science requires).
Instead, the interviewer actually engages (in a second-person way)
to preserve the ﬁrst-person experience. The goal of the interviewer
is not to remain an objective third-person observer (an impor-
tant aspect of cognitive science methods); the goal is to assist
the participant in “opening” to her own experience. The inter-
viewer can do the cognitive work of keeping the reﬂection on
target, exploring the experienced thoughts, emotions, and sen-
sations of the participant, as the participant would do on her
own if she were so trained. With properly trained interviewers,
the participant need not be trained, as the interviewer adopts the
cognitive burden for making the reﬂective attitude possible. The
interviewer is essentially doing a share of the processing, inter-
actively working to assist the participant in accessing her own
experiences. In this process, there is no need for the interviewer
to ascribe any mental states to the participant, or to engage in
mindreading (understood in the standard way in social cogni-
tion), nor is there a need for the interviewer to access her own
mental models or simulations of what the other’s mind is. The
interviewer, quite plainly, participates, interactively, in the artic-
ulation of the participant’s experience. In this way, the scientiﬁc
concept of bias is important to eliminate. This requires inter-
viewers to know the scientiﬁc method and need for controlling
extraneous variables. Language mediates (with support of second-
person pronouns used by the interviewer), to direct the naïve
participant toward accessing the embodied memory of experi-
ence, just as experience in mindfulness training would allow the
expert meditator to access the experience independently. Tradi-
tional cognitive science often tries to force the participant into an
objective mold of predesigned conceptual frameworks. In con-
trast, the interactions of the interview allow a switch of directions
altogether and temporarily allows the researcher to participate in
the participant’s subjectivity. The resulting interview can make
manifest an experiential record that traditional methods cannot
reveal.
Consequently, the third lesson involves a “training trade-off”
in integration of the interview into experimental design and exe-
cution. NP methods can work with this adjustment in focus from
the participant to the interviewer, and the re-evaluation needed
for each unique experiment. The interviewers can pull from mul-
tiple tools and techniques with the aim of eliciting the necessary
acts of reﬂection and articulation. Petitmengin (2006) outlines
many of the practical techniques, but in the contexts of speciﬁc
experiments one has to consider how such techniques can be put
to use. Interviewers should be subjected to rigorous training and
rehearsal to prepare them for the interview tasks. This training
should include an assessment of the anticipated personalities and
behavioral idiosyncrasies likely to be expected by a given popu-
lation of participants. That assessment would direct the focus of
the training, so that interviewer responses to anticipated barriers
would become more natural and automatic. Training should also
include mitigation of interviewer personality quirks that might
otherwise inﬂuence interactions. The baseline study interview
transcripts revealed that one interviewer was more extroverted
and used more informal language than the other two interviewers,
which seemed to elicit different responses perhaps because of per-
ceived rapport by the participants. The interviewer should behave
as if she is a prosthetic for the participant and the questions must
support that participant’s exploration of her experience without
imposition of the interviewer’s bias. In this way, the interviewer
is an extension of the scientiﬁc team members involved in a NP
experiment.
CONCLUSION
Reﬂecting on our own experiences in conducting a baseline study
employing NP methods, we have explicated a number of problems
that we encountered and made suggestions for addressing such
problems. The ﬁrst involves improving communication practices
among research team members and establishing a shared under-
standing of the methods and goals of neurophenomenology. This
is especially important since neurophenomenology involves cer-
tain ways of rethinking received scientiﬁc procedures and is not
the standard approach in which many of the researchers have
been trained. The second involves the importance of incorporating
some of the best scientiﬁc practices into NP methods, especially
those that involve control, reliability, generalizability, and replica-
tion. The third suggestion involves the use of a phenomenological
interview technique and the question of who gets trained, and
how. Each of these suggestions should be considered in the variable
contexts of NP research.
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